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"Born Anew" Versus Bruce Murray 
"Born Again" 
Albert D. Wheelon's 
thoughtful analysis, originally presented July 15, 1986, establishes many 
crucial points. First, NASA's total concentration on a "Shuttle-only" program 
led to the disastrous current state of the United States' space program. 
Wheelon is right in stating that the United States must now use its disarray 
to good purpose by restructuring the national space program to use the 
Shuttle and its astronauts solely for those activities that genuinely require 
the presence of humans in space. All other payloads and launch vehicle 
systems must be free to utilize automated means, which are generally cheaper 
and more flexible. Objective application of this criterion will drastically reduce 
the number of Shuttle launches required. Thus, Wheelon's analysis leads to 
the conclusion that there is no need to procure another Shuttle Orbiter to 
replace Challenger or to complete and operate the second Shuttle launch site 
at Vandenberg Air Force Base in California. Second, Wheelon eloquently 
points out the fallacy of NASA's new focus on a Space Station as the central 
element for future civilian space efforts. NASA is repeating the underlying 
error of the past-namely, constructing U.S. civil space infrastructure upon 
the erroneous policy that the human must be part of nearly every significant 
civil space function (unlike the Soviets who maintain vigorous and separate 
manned and unmanned programs). Third, Wheelon correctly emphasizes 
that the overriding, immediate need of the United States' space program is 
for practical and cost-effective expendable launch options for military pay-
loads, for communications satellites, and for space science and applications 
payloads. Fourth, the "Shuttle-only" program has indeed, as he asserts, 
dissipated the United States' once unchallenged leadership in planetary ex-
ploration, reducing it now to, at best, a fading coequal. Broad domestic 
political and popular support for planetary exploration has not been effec-
tively translated over the last decade into new exploratory space missions 
because of NASA's competing priority for use of the manned Shuttle as an 
(inappropriate) launch vehicle for unmanned deep space missions. 
This article is contribution no. 4431 of the Division of Geological and Planetary Sciences, 
California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, California. 
Bruce Murray is Professor of Planetary Science at the California Institute of Technology. 
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"Born Anew" 1179 
Unfortunately, Presidential decisions about NASA, made subsequent to 
Wheelan's July 15 paper, indicate that the lessons highlighted by the Chal-
lenger explosion have only been partly assimilated by the White House. 
Military space payloads have indeed been released from the artificial launch 
restraints imposed since 1972 by the "Shuttle-only" national policy. The 
Department of Defense is once again able to carry out military space activities 
in a cost-effective manner. The White House also directed NASA to get out 
of the commercial launch business (a move that Wheelon feels will cripple 
U.S. commercial competition). These really have only been White House 
budget decisions, not major policy decisions. The military has been freed to 
spend its space budget as it wishes, and NASA's subsidy of commercial 
launches has been proscribed. Sadly, no real goals or directions have been 
set for NASA itself. 
Space science and applications efforts, unfortunately, remain chained to 
the fallacies of the 1970s. NASA continues to avoid objective consideration 
of expendable launch vehicles for major space science and planetary explo-
ration missions. "Forced busing in space" remains the policy for those activ-
ities NASA still controls financially, such as space science. 
President Reagan's decision to build a fourth Orbiter over a peculiarly long 
time scale means that it cannot help to alleviate the present serious shortage 
of launch vehicles for military and commercial purposes. By the time the 
fourth Orbiter becomes available, expendable launch vehicle systems will be 
widely available and used for all high-priority military and commercial needs. 
For what critical national purpose, then, is the extra Orbiter so desperately 
needed? 
In addition, the White House has opted to retain the Vandenberg launch 
capability, although in a nonoperational status. The reactivation of Vanden-
berg is tied to the completion of the fourth Orbiter, seemingly a case of one 
bad decision leading to another. Thus, to the already excessive costs per 
flight intrinsic to the Shuttle in the 1990s, we must add 2 to 3 billion dollars 
for the fourth Orbiter and 300 to 400 million dollars more per year for 
reactivating Vandenberg. 
There is no conceivable scenario in which such expenditures will be cost-
effective compared to use of expendable launch vehicles in the same time 
period. NASA is once again on the path toward financial disaster. The fourth 
Orbiter and Vandenberg decisions mainly served to relieve politically a White 
House baffled by trying to reconcile Reagan's instinctive support for manned 
space flight with economic and technical reality. 
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Now, freed from any Presidential requirement to provide a logical, cost-
effective, and internationally competitive space program (which might have 
been a plausible outcome of the national questioning after Challenger), NASA 
has reverted to its 1970s view of Shuttle and Space Station as goals in their 
own right. There has been no serious national debate as to the functional 
utility of a Space Station nor any dispassionate evaluation of the significance 
to U.S. plans of the Soviet MIR Space Station capability. The Soviet Union 
now has a ten-year lead in obtaining whatever benefits a Space Station offers. 
Most seriously, the President has not linked the Shuttle/Space Station concept 
to any future U.S. commitment to send astronauts to Mars or to some other 
equally adventurous and historic activity. In the absence of long-term direc-
tion and critical review, NASA continues to survive by brokering superficial 
slogans (and big budget programs) among Congressional special interests . 
Unfortunately, the NASA post-Challenger program that has evolved in the 
last six months is a born again 1970s version, not the born again 1960s concept 
Wheelon advocates. This NASA direction is inefficient and financially waste-
ful and-unless soon reversed-will doom the United States to second-rate 
status in civilian space activities well into the next century. 
What the U.S. President must do is establish a compelling destination for 
Americans in space. The next significant benchmark will be the first human 
landings on Mars. This is a logical goal for U.S. manned flight if targeted 
during the first quarter of the next century. The manned Mars flight would 
vitalize civilian space generally and rationalize the time scale and character 
of the Shuttle and Space Station programs. 
In a recent article entitled "Whither America in Space?" (Issues in Science 
and Technology, March 1986), I advocated serious consideration of a joint 
Soviet/U.S. first human flight to Mars. I argued that Apollo moon competition 
served the United States' national interests in the Sputnik-dominated early 
1960s, but that a similar Apollo-type competition to Mars with the Soviets 
now, when total U.S. space assets and technologies (including SDI) are vast, 
would not serve the same national purpose nor command comparable polit-
ical support. In contrast, the national and international political significance 
of a joint Soviet/U.S. long-term space endeavor of imaginative and peaceful 
character could well yield national security benefits comparable to those of 
Apollo. A world-and an American people-weary and disheartened by stale 
nuclear slogans and by the expensive strategic weapons programs of both 
superpowers could not fail to be convinced that a new era in the superpower 
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relationship was at hand. Recent progress by U.S. and Soviet negotiators on 
renewing a Cooperation in Space agreement emphasizes the political time-
liness of considering such a goal. 
Wheelon expresses concern over the difficulty of collaborating with the 
Soviets on any major, long-term endeavor. However, it is possible to organize 
most of the development effort for a future manned Mars mission around 
complementary aspects of the existing national space programs of the two 
countries. For example, the Soviets have had enduring interest in long-term 
human flight and in Space Stations-first Salyut and now MIR. A key de-
velopment for the human flight to Mars will probably be very large spinning 
cruise modules to provide to crews mild but adequate amounts of artificial 
gravity during the two to three years of space travel involved in planetary 
round trips . The development of such giant habitats would be a logical 
extension of the existing Soviet manned flight program. Such an interplan-
etary cruise module could be developed in steps by the Soviets right up to 
the actual Mars flight units being first tested and then operated for years in 
Earth orbit. 
In parallel, the United States might develop the technology and space 
infrastructure necessary for a very large propulsion system to be assembled 
and fueled in orbit. Such mammoth propulsion systems will be required for 
round-trip human flights to the surface of Mars. This long-term development 
activity by the United States would be consistent with our self-selected Shut-
tle focus and would provide some needed direction for the Space Station 
development as well. 
Like the spinning habitat development, the giant orbit propulsion system 
lends itself to a staged development in Earth orbit over many years. The 
Mars descent and ascent systems can be developed much later by either or 
both countries. 
In such a joint Man-to-Mars scenario, if either partner were to withdraw 
from the collaborative effort, the remaining partner could develop the missing 
technology on its own and carry out a unilateral mission at a later date. 
Thus, if both countries intend to go to Mars eventually anyway, substantial 
political, cost, and schedule benefits may accrue for both partners in a joint 
program. And at least the early portions of such a hypothetical U.S ./Soviet 
manned Mars endeavor can be organized in · such a way that neither side 
would be hostage to withdrawal on the part of the other. A further inhibition 
to withdrawal would be the likely presence of other spacefaring nations as 
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junior partners on the project. Withdrawal by either superpower in a broad 
international endeavor would create a political strain with allies as well as 
adversaries. 
For well over a decade, the United States has been living in a self-contained 
"Cinerama" fantasy, nourished by repeated assertions that Shuttle develop-
ment would make space safe, easy, and inexpensive. Challenger demon-
strated tragically that space flight is far from safe. The decline of other 
elements of our national space program even prior to that time painfully illus-
trated that the Shuttle is neither effective nor cheap as a general space 
transportation system. 
The United States has not been competing or collaborating in space. In-
stead, it has been treating civilian space as a domestic political football to be 
brokered in Congress along with other nonessential, discretionary activities; 
domestic perceptions, rather than sustained competitive achievements, were 
all that really counted. 
If the United States is to return once again to greatness in space, it will 
begin when an effective President credibly links new civilian space activities 
to our future world status. Rather than seeking an elusive "born again" 
reappearance of the particular technical, political, and international circum-
stances of the 1960s, the United States should anticipate a chance for its 
space efforts to be "born anew" as part of a more mature relationship among 
the superpowers and the other nations of the world. 
